



Carlos Andres **Perez**, pericles12[at]gmail.com  
Universidad Jorge Tadeo Lozano, Colombia



## **Horizon: a key phenomenological concept for cognitive linguistics**

Cognitive linguistics shares with static approaches to language its commitment with finding and identifying the linguistic structures (the linguistics *forms*) that lie beneath ordinary language use, be it presented as intersubjective normative structures (Zlatev, 2010), or as subjective mental ones (such as image schemas (Johnson, 1985) or closed-class forms (Talmy, 2003), for example). On the other hand, cognitive linguistics shares with recent approaches stemming from enactivism (Cuffari et al, 2014; Di Paolo and DeJaegher, 2015) and dynamical systems (Fusaroli and Raczaszek-Leonardi, 2014) its concern with the intersubjective and situated nature of language, the understanding of which demands new theoretical and methodological tools, and new descriptive categories such as *participatory sense making* or *synergy*, to name a few. For example, Conceptual Blending Theory, as presented in its semiotic version by L. Brand, (2013) takes into account the situated nature of meaning construction (base space), while relying on static forms in the configuration of emergent meaning space (relevance space).

In my presentation I will try to capture and elaborate this tension within a phenomenological framework, following and developing the husserlian notion of *horizon*. First, I will give a phenomenological characterization of the notion of horizon, highlighting its intimate relationship with the notions of *lived body* and *time consciousness*. Then, I will point out the centrality of the notion of horizon for cognitive linguistics, working on three different levels: 1. *Inner horizon* as understood in the analyses of perceptual experience. 2. *Outer horizon*, as a key concept for understanding the notions of frame and domain, both central in the theoretical landscape of cognitive linguistics. 3. *Intersubjective horizon*, following a *generative* characterization of the intersubjective world (Steinbock, 1995), in order to understand the enactive approach to language.

To make my point clear, I will end my presentation discussing two recent theoretical proposals (Bundgaard et al, 2006; Fusaroli and Raczaszek-Leonardi, 2014) based on this phenomenological framework.

### **References**

- Brandt, L. (2012) *The Communicative Mind: A Linguistic Exploration of Conceptual Integration and Meaning Construction*. Cambridge Scholar Publishing. Cambridge.
- Bundgaard, P., S. Østergaard, and F. Stjernfelt. (2006) Waterproof fire stations? Conceptual schemata and cognitive operations involved in compound constructions. *Semiotica*, 161:363-393.
- Cuffari, E. Di Paolo, E., De Jaegher, H. (2014). From participatory sense-making to language: There and back again. In: *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences*, doi 10.1007/s11097-014-9404-9.
- Di Paolo, E. and De Jaegher, H. (2015). Toward an embodied science of intersubjectivity: widening the scope of social understanding research. In: *Front. Psychol.* 6:234. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00234
- Johnson, M. (1985). *The body in the mind*. University of Chicago, Chicago.
- Steinbock, A. (1995) *Home and beyond. Generative phenomenology beyond Husserl*. Northwestern University Press, Evanston.
- Talmy, L. (2000) *Toward a cognitive semantics*. MIT Press, Cambridge.
- Zlatev, J. (2010). Phenomenology and cognitive linguistics. In: Shaun Gallagher and Dan Schmicking (eds). *Handbook on Phenomenology and Cognitive Science*, 415-446. Dordrecht: Springer.