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## Seeing the Unseeable: Abductions as Creative Firstnesses

This inquiry investigates the influence of hallucinations upon abductive reasoning and ultimately upon truth-seeking (cf. West in press). It explores the semiosis of unbidden envisionments -- guessing right by entertaining perceptual judgments arising from uncontrolled hunches in Firstness. Well-founded guesses in Firstness surface spontaneously, sometimes from other, more foundational Firstnesses, and sometimes from brute force real-world impositions in Secondness. In either case, Peirce's contention that foundational inferences (abductions) derive from "judicative perception" (5.186: 1903) validates the influence of idiosyncratic, created judgments upon hypothesis-making, and ultimately upon the process of truth-seeking.

The pervasive hold of different kinds of Firstnesses (hallucinations, fantasies, and dreams) upon individual emotive profiles and action habits will be showcased. Accordingly, Peirce's three kinds of hallucination (EP2: 192 1903) will be outlined (obsessional, social, creative); and the myriad ways in which inferences emerge from unforeseen inner sources to play out as active strategies will be addressed. In fact, Peirce's pragmatic account emphasizing that signs are ultimately grounded in experience, however empirical, is obviously not insulated from seeds germinated in the Firstness of the guessing instinct. Peirce's creative kind of hallucinations (not grounded in delusion or fear) giving rise to novel action habits can defy mere convention, by growing up in episodes of bodily mimesis. The promise of Peirce's third kind of hallucination (creative) will be distinguished as a forum for birthing fictional objects/concepts (versus imaginary ones), rather than encroachment of faulty reasoning – a comparison which Gibson (1979: 261) clearly articulates. For Gibson, "fiction" enhances information pickup, and does not "automatically lead one astray," akin to Peirce's creative hallucination.

These created judicative perceptions give rise to perceptual judgments which qualify as "extreme abductive inferences" (5.180-212: 1903) – illustrating that the playing-field for the emergence of good guesses may best be just this kind of hallucination, because it is by way of spontaneous but uncontrolled judgments that idiosyncratic fictions have the best chance for implementation. Peirce is adamant that dreams and imaginings inhabit our very action habits: "Day dreams are often spoken of as mere idleness...but for the remarkable fact that they go to form habits...by virtue of which we really behave in the manner we had dreamed of doing" (6.286: 1893). In fact, it is in children's play that dreams often inscribe themselves upon localized canvases of Secondness, when freedom to prescind (to narrowly focus upon pregnant possibilities) can supersede mere conventions in Thirdness.

### References

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